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December 15, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR

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FROM:

A. W. Marshall *AWM*

SUBJECT:

Future Meetings

I read with interest your responses and appreciate the time and effort which went into them. Several ideas were presented which have been useful in suggesting what we should do next. The responses also indicated where it would be useful for me to try to express more clearly my thoughts.

To reiterate my comments in the first meeting, I believe that the product could be improved by using new methodologies to examine the information (raw data) now available. Analysis based upon assumptions about the behavior of an organization, the relationship of behavioral patterns to organizational factors, etc., is one such methodology. The response I have frequently received to this view is that additional information (raw data) was needed to employ these methodologies. The purpose of this informal group is to discuss the questions -- Is that so? If so, what additional raw data is necessary or most desirable?

Your replies put forward four major themes:

- The need to discuss the problems inherent in getting analysts to use new methodologies -- teaching them, providing back.

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DECLAS - IMPDET  
BYAUTH - Gen. Haig

NSC review(s) completed.

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ground material, overcoming personal and organizational resistance.

- The need to explore the use of a new methodology, such as analysis based upon insights regarding organizational behavior, in a specific case -- either evaluating a past effort (e.g., the SS-9, a [ ] series product, etc.) or studying a new area (e.g., OSR's study of a new Soviet missile, French economic policy, etc.) -- in order to develop a clear concept of what types of analysis and information are required.
- New methodologies should be examined to see where they would be of most value -- e.g., in a military analysis, in estimates for current products, in political and economic products, etc.
- A survey should be conducted of the different methodologies available and the information required to use them.

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I believe we should initially put off discussing the problems of implementing new methodologies, although certainly that issue can be raised within the context of other discussions. Implementation is a critical problem, but I feel we will understand the underlying difficulties more thoroughly after we have discussed more fully one or more methodologies. I believe that we should pick a methodology, come to some view as to its use, and see what it requires in terms of additional information. Then we can discuss how one might get the appropriate additional information. Other methodologies might be examined, and we could return in the end to the issue of implementation if we wish to do so.

In the next meeting, therefore, I would like to discuss the use of organizational behavior analysis (similar to Graham Allison's Model II and III approach), its possible role in intelligence analysis, and what sorts of data might be needed to use it. To give it relevance, I think it would be valuable to look at its application in a past product; the SS-9 study would be a good case because it already incorporates a lot of community effort and is familiar to most of us.

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I recommend for our next meeting -- probably in mid-January -- that each of you read portions of Allison's work dealing with Model II and III analysis. I can suggest additional readings if you have the time. Then I think you should read the SS-9 study as it finally appeared and ask the following questions:

- Where could a general understanding of organizational behavior have enabled us to more fully understand Soviet missile programs, and in particular the SS-9? For example, why did the SS-9 program use storable liquid propellants; why did deployment stop at approximately 300 missiles? What are the major influences on the changes in successive missiles, e.g., SS-7 to SS-9, or Models I, II, etc.?
- What insights can we get into the way the SRF functions by understanding how it was formed and what kinds of people run it?
- What would we predict about future activities of the SRF? What could it do? What is doubtful that it will do?
- What additional data could have helped answer these questions?
- Are these above questions in your opinion relevant to producing intelligence analyses?

Several interesting study topics were also proposed in the responses:

- Soviet military R&D
- French economic policy
- Japanese decisionmaking in the economic field
- Decisionmaking relating to a new Soviet missile

I would like at later meetings to discuss the potential value and information requirements of these topics. Consequently, it would

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be most helpful if each of you would elaborate on your respective suggestions and develop them in preparation for detailed discussion with the group at some point in the future. I will be in touch with each of you separately about this matter.

I would appreciate comments from you on whether this is an acceptable plan. For our next meeting and our future direction, rather than a written response, it might be more convenient for George Pickett to call you and obtain your comments.

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